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Abstract—Smart grids are large and complex cyber physical
infrastructures that require real-time monitoring for ensuring
the security and reliability of the system. Monitoring the smart
grid involves analyzing continuous data-stream from various
measurement devices deployed throughout the system, which
are topologically distributed and structurally interrelated. In
this paper, graph signal processing (GSP) has been used to
represent and analyze the power grid measurement data. It is
shown that GSP can enable various analyses for the power grid’s
structured data and dynamics of its interconnected components.
Particularly, the effects of various cyber and physical stresses in
the power grid are evaluated and discussed both in the vertex and
the graph-frequency domains of the signals. Several techniques
for detecting and locating cyber and physical stresses based on
GSP techniques have been presented and their performances have
been evaluated and compared. The presented study shows that
GSP can be a promising approach for analyzing the power grid’s
data.
Index Terms—Smart grid security, cyber attack, graph signal
processing, local smoothness, vertex-frequency representation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data analysis for the security and reliability of smart grids
has attracted lots of attention in the past decade. As the smart
grid maintains its proper functioning by continuous acquisition
(from an increasing number of sensors deployed in the system)
and processing of the measurement data, any attack on the
availability and integrity of the data can lead to improper
decisions and actions, which may result in instability and
failures in the system. For this reason, it is essential to detect
and locate anomalies in the smart grid quickly and accurately.
Different types of cyber attacks can be launched by attackers
in smart grids. Among them, the denial of service (DoS) attack
[1], [2], the data-replay attack [1], [3], the false data injection
attack (FDIA) [4], [5] have been extensively studied by the
researchers. These attacks can, for example, be launched on the
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) readings
and component status reports as well as on the time-stamped
synchrophasor measurements from the phasor measurement
units (PMUs). In addition to cyber stresses, physical stresses
can also affect the reliability and stability of the system.
Examples of such stresses include line and generator failures,
and abrupt changes in the loads.
In this paper, Graph Signal Processing (GSP) [6], [7] has
been exploited for representation and analyses of the smart
grid’s data for reliability and security purposes. GSP is a fast-
growing field, which extends the classical signal processing
techniques and tools to irregular graph domain instead of the
Euclidean domain. GSP is suitable for analyzing structured
data and the dynamics of systems with interconnected com-
ponents. In this paper, it has been shown that by representing
the smart grid data using graph signals, one can exploit the
rich tools that GSP provides to exploit the implicit structures
in the smart grid data for security and reliability analyses.
Specifically, for the analyses of data from complex networked
systems, such as power system, their physical topology as
well as the structured interactions (model-based or data-driven
interactions) among the components [8] are of immense impor-
tance. While connectivities and interactions cannot be captured
by the classical signal processing approaches, GSP provides
a framework to capture such information in graph signals.
Since GSP considers the graph structure of the data along
with the signals, it is particularly suitable for representing and
analyzing data from smart grids.
In this paper, various properties of graph signals both
in the vertex domain and the graph-frequency domain have
been analyzed. Moreover, several techniques for detecting and
locating various cyber and physical stresses in the system have
been proposed based on GSP techniques. Specifically, various
data integrity attacks (cyber stresses), such as DoS attack,
data-replay attack, and false data injection attack as well as
failure of a single transmission line (as the physical stress)
have been considered in the study. Based on the effects of
different stresses on the graph Fourier transform (GFT), the
local smoothness, and the vertex-frequency energy distribution
of the graph signals, various stress detection and locating
techniques are proposed. The performances of the proposed
techniques are tested and it is shown that GSP can provide
a promising framework for representing power system’s data,
particularly, for stress detection and locating.
II. RELATED WORKS
In this section, we briefly review the related work in two
categories. In the first category, some of the developments
in the area of GSP have been reviewed, and in the second
category security studies in smart grids have been discussed.
Over the last decade, GSP has emerged and extended the
concepts of classical signal processing to irregular graph do-
main. Several works have been published on the interpretation
of the frequency domain in the context of graph signals
[6], [7], [9]. The tools and theories built based on these
interpretations allow studying graph signals in a new domain
with a similar notion to the frequency domain for classical
2signals. For instance, the relationship between the graph signal
frequency and the eigenvalues of the graph Laplacian as well
as various concepts related to the graph signal frequency,
e.g., global and local smoothness of signals, graph filtering,
and modulation of graph signals have been discussed. More-
over, analogous to the joint time-frequency representation of
temporal signals, the concept of vertex-frequency analysis of
graph signals has been developed and interpreted in [10],
[11]. However, unlike the Fourier basis functions, the bases
for representing graph signals in the frequency domain, i.e.,
eigenvectors of the graph Laplacian, are localized in nature.
Windowed graph Fourier transform (WGFT) [12] and graph
wavelet transform (GWT) [13] have also been introduced.
Inspired from the concept of time-frequency energy distribu-
tions in the classical signal processing (e.g., Rihaczek energy
distribution [14]), the work by Stankovic´ et. al. [15] introduces
vertex-frequency energy distributions in the context of graph
signal processing. The vertex-frequency energy distributions
can be useful for studying the frequency characteristics of the
graph signal in a vertex-localized manner. A few works have
also been published on the time-vertex signal processing [16],
[17], which treats a time-series associated with each of the
vertices of a graph.
GSP techniques have been used in various applications
in the past decade, e.g., sensor networks [18], biological
networks, brain connectivity [19], Electrocardiogram (ECG)
signal analysis [20], image, and video processing [21]. Specif-
ically, researchers have shown that GSP can be a prospective
field for detecting anomalies in different types of networks
[22], [23]. However, the application of GSP to smart grids
has been limited. For instance, Ramakrishna and Scaglione
[24] modeled the voltage phasor measurements in the power
grid as the output of the low-pass graph filter in response to the
low-rank excitation that comes from the generators. Kroizer et.
al. in [25] approximated the non-linear measurement functions
in the power grid as the output of a graph filter and proposed
a regularized least-squares estimator for signal recovery based
on the inverse of the obtained graph filter.
Next, we will briefly review security studies in smart grids.
Over the past few decades, cyber security of smart grids
has attracted lots of attention [1]. Detecting and locating
different kinds of cyber attacks [3]–[5] are some of the
most important challenges in this context. On the other hand,
detecting and locating physical stresses in the grid are also of
great importance for the operation and maintenance purpose
of the grid. In literature, the detection of cyber attacks and
physical stresses have been addressed together under the topic
of anomaly detection in the smart grid as well as discussed
separately.
Different techniques for detecting and locating cyber and
physical stresses in the smart grid have been proposed in the
literature based on both the traditional SCADA measurements
as well as the high-frequency PMU measurements. The de-
tection methods based on state estimation of power systems
are well suited for the SCADA based static monitoring system
while the time-series prediction based methods exploiting the
space-time relationship among the states are more applicable
to PMU based dynamic system monitoring [26]. There are
some machine-learning-based as well for the detection of
stresses in the smart grid. For the real-time detection of the
cyber attacks in smart grids, several works have been emerged.
For example, Kurt et. al. [27] proposed a generalized cumula-
tive sum algorithm for the detection of cyber attack in smart
grids in both centralized and distributed manner. Principle
component analysis (PCA) and dimensionality reduction based
methods [28], [29] are also being used for the detection of
attacks in power systems. In some works, the spatial and
temporal correlations among the states of the power system’
components have been exploited to detect and locate cyber
attacks and physical stresses in real-time [30], [31]. Neural
network-based methods for anomaly detection include the
works in [32], [33]. For the detection of line failure in the
grid specifically, Hossain and Rahnamay-Naeini [34] proposed
a method based on a linear regression method to analyze PMU
data. Deng et. al. [35] proposed the detection of a single line
outage by detecting peaks in frequency signals from the PMUs
and locating the outage from the changes in the active power.
Detection and locating cyber attacks in the smart grid using
GSP is new in the power system’s literature. Drayer and
Routtenberg [36], [37] proposed a Graph Fourier Transform
(GFT) based detection method for false data injection attacks
in smart grids. In their work, it is assumed that the graph signal
associated with the bus voltage angles of the power system
is smooth and for this reason, the high-frequency components
(corresponding to the large eigenvalues of the graph Laplacian)
of the graph signal would be insignificant. The existence of the
anomalous or false data is proposed to be detected based on
the existence of significant high-frequency components. The
authors also proposed locating FDIA using graph modulation
[38]. Ramakrishna and Scaglione [39] also utilized their model
developed based on GSP in [24] to detect FDIA in the smart
grid.
In this work, several techniques for detecting and locating
cyber attacks and single transmission line failures in the smart
grid have been discussed in the graph-frequency domain as
well as in the joint vertex-frequency domain.
III. GSP REPRESENTATION OF POWER SYSTEM
MEASUREMENTS
A. Preliminaries and Definitions
The first important definition in GSP is the definition of
the graph signal. While in classical signal processing, signals
are defined by Euclidean representation of their values; in
GSP, the graph signals are defined by the values residing on
vertices V (i.e., V = {v1, v2, ..., vN}), which are connected
over graph G = (V , E) with E representing the set of links (i.e.,
E = {eij : (i, j) ∈ V × V}). The graph signal can formally
be represented by a vector of values denoted by x with size
N defined as x : V → R. A graph G enables capturing
the interactions among vertices’ variables. Therefore, one of
the important steps in defining graph signals is to specify
the underlying connectivities among the components, i.e. the
graph domain.
3B. Defining graph domain for power grids
In this paper, our discussion will be limited to the undirected
graphs of two types (1) Bus-vertex graph: a weighted undi-
rected graph in which buses are considered as the vertices and
the transmission lines or the branches are considered as the
edges, and (2) Line-vertex graph: an unweighted undirected
graph in which the transmission lines are considered as the
vertices and each edge represents a common bus between
a pair of vertices (transmission lines). Since the Bus-vertex
graph structure remains unchanged during the cyber attacks,
we propose to use this structure for the detection and locating
of cyber attacks, whereas the Line-vertex graph structure is
more suitable for the study of line failures in the power system,
as the Bus-vertex graph changes due to failures. For the rest
of the paper, the Bus-vertex graphs will be denoted by G and
the line-vertex graphs will be denoted by GL.
Note that the above graphs are based on the physical topol-
ogy of the power system. However, the interactions among the
components of the power system can be beyond the physical
topology. As such, other methods of constructing a graph
domain for power grids can also be used. For instance, the
data-driven and electric-distance-based methods discussed in
[8], can be used to infer and construct graph domains for
power grids beyond their physical connectivities (when needed
depending on the analyses of interest).
In this paper, the geographical distance between buses i
and j is denoted by dij and the weight corresponding to the
edge eij in the bus-vertex graph G is defined as wij = 1dij ,
if there is an edge between node i and node j (i.e., eij = 1)
and wij = 0, otherwise (if there is no edge between node i
and node j, i.e., eij = 0). For the line-vertex graph GL, the
weights of the edges are considered as: wij = 1, if eij = 1,
and wij = 0, otherwise.
Another important definition related to the graph is its
Laplacian matrix L, where its element lij is defined as:
lij =
{∑N
j=1 wij , if, i = j
−wij if, i 6= j
Since, the graph Laplacian, L is a real and symmetric matrix,
it has real and non-negative eigenvalues corresponding to the
orthonormal set of eigenvectors. The Laplacian matrix of the
graph will be used later in defining the frequency domain
representation of graph signals.
C. Representation of Power System Measurements as Graph
Signals: Vertex Domain Representation
The graph signal associated with the graph, G, can be
defined as a mapping of the vertices into a vector of real
numbers with size N , x : V → R. Here, x(vn) is the value
of the graph signal at vertex vn. However, for simplicity, this
signal will be denoted by x(n) instead of x(vn) for the rest
of the paper.
In this paper, we consider the measurement values associ-
ated with each vertex (bus voltage angles for G and real-power
flow or line current angle for GL) at a time instance as a graph
signal. These measurement values can be obtained from the
SCADA readings, or from the PMU measurement at a specific
time instance (assuming PMUs are mounted on every bus in
the system). Fig. 1 illustrates the graph signal of the voltage
angles of all the buses for the IEEE 118 bus system [40]. On
the other hand, xL(n) is the graph signal associated with GL,
which is corresponding to the current measurements in the
transmission lines of the system.
Fig. 1. Voltage angle measurements at a particular time instance as a Graph
Signal on the IEEE 118 bus system.
The measurement values at different time instances can
be modeled as time-series associated with each vertex. The
resultant graph signal becomes also a function of time, i.e., a
time-varying graph signal that has been discussed in detail in
subsequent subsections.
D. Spectral Characteristics of Power Grid’s Graph Signal -
Graph-Frequency Domain
In classical signal processing, the concept of frequency
for temporal signals is explained with Fourier transform,
which is a linear transform with basis function ejωt, where
ω = 2πf and f is the frequency variable. In fact, ejωt is the
eigenfunction of the one dimensional Laplacian operator ∆,
i.e., ∆(ejωt) = −ω2ejωt. The Fourier transform of a temporal
signal x(t) is:
Xˆ(ω) =
∫ ∞
t=−∞
x(t)(ejωt)∗dt, (Analysis equation) (1)
x(t) =
∫ ∞
ω=−∞
1
2π
Xˆ(ω)(ejωt)dω, (Synthesis equation).
(2)
Analogous to the concept of Fourier transform and fre-
quency domain representation of the signal, the basis func-
tions for the graph Fourier transform are considered as the
eigenvectors denoted by uk(n) of the graph Laplacian L
(defined in Section III.B), where subscript k denotes the k−th
eigenvector and n is the index of n−th node in the graph
G. The corresponding eigenvalues to these eigenvectors are
denoted by (λk) and are considered as the graph-frequencies.
The graph Fourier transform (GFT) of a graph signal x(n)
is:
Xˆ(λk) =
N∑
n=1
x(n)uk(n), (Analysis equation) (3)
4Fig. 2. Two of the eigenvectors for IEEE 118 bus systems Graph. The two
eigenvectors are localized around two different vertices.
and the inverse graph Fourier transform (IGFT) is:
x(n) =
N∑
k=1
Xˆ(λk)uk(n), (Synthesis equation) (4)
where λk and uk are, respectively, the k−th eigenvalue and the
k−th eigenvector of L, where 0 = λ1 < λ2 < λ3 < ... < λN .
The first eigenvalue λ1 = 0 is analogous to the zero-
frequency (DC component) in the case of temporal signals.
The eigenvectors with lower eigenvalues correspond to the
lower frequency components with less variation of the values
of the signal as local neighborhoods. The higher eigenvectors
(larger k) correspond to the high-frequency components that
have a higher rate of changes in the node-to-node values. In
contrast to the classical Fourier transforms basic functions,
the graph Laplacian eigenvectors are localized in the vertex
domain. For example, Fig. 2 illustrates two eigenvectors of
the graph structure corresponding to the IEEE 118 bus system
that are localized around two different locations in the graph.
E. Global and Local Smoothness of Graph Signals
The smoothness measure of a signal quantifies how rapidly
the values of the signal changes. In a graph signal, the smooth-
ness characterizes the variation of the signal over graph neigh-
borhoods, i.e., from each vertex to its neighboring vertices.
The global smoothness signifies the aggregated variations in
the signal while local smoothness signifies variation in the
vicinity of each vertex.
a) Global Smoothness: The global smoothness of a
graph signal x(n) is defined as:
sGlobal =
xTLx
xT x
, (5)
where x is the vector representation of the graph signal, x(n).
The faster the graph signal changes from vertex to vertex, the
larger the value of sGlobal.
b) Local Smoothness: The local smoothness of the graph
signal x(n) at vertex n is defined as:
s(n) =
lx(n)
x(n)
, x(n) 6= 0, (6)
where lx(n) is the n−th element of the vector, Lx. In equation
(6), s(n) signifies how fast the values of the graph signal
x(n) changes from vertex to vertex in the vicinity of the
n−th vertex. The work by Dakovic´ et al. presented in [41]
shows that the concept of local smoothness in the graph signal
is analogous to the concept of instantaneous frequency in
classical signal processing.
F. The Joint Vertex-Frequency Representations
In classical signal processing, the joint time-frequency
representation of signals (e.g., spectrum, windowed Fourier
transform, wavelets, etc.) are used for the time-localization of
a particular frequency component. The joint vertex-frequency
representations serve the similar purpose for graph signals.
There are different approaches for the localization of the fre-
quency components in the literature. For example, Stankovic´
et. al. [11] propose localized vertex spectrum (LVS) of graph
signal x(n) as:
LV Sx(n, λk) =
N∑
m=1
x(m)h(n−m)uk(m), (7)
where h(n) is the window function. This approach has a
major drawback of being dependent on the width and the
characteristics of the window function. Instead, for improving
the localization of the signal energy in the joint vertex-
frequency domain, the vertex-frequency energy distribution
is introduced in [15], which does not require any window.
The Vertex-frequency energy distribution E(n, k) is calculated
from the graph signal using the equation:
E(n, k) =
N∑
m=1
x(n)x(m)uk(m)uk(n). (8)
However, the smoothed version of the vertex-frequency
energy distribution makes the vertex-frequency representation
less sensitive to changes and disturbances.
G. Time-Varying Graph Signals
In our previous discussions, we have only considered the
graph signal at a single time instant. However, in dynamic
systems, such as power grids, values of the signal at each node
5vary in time. For instance, the bus voltage measurements in
power grids change in time because of changes in load demand
and other changes in the power system. As a result, the graph
signal x(n) changes in time. Therefore, a time-varying graph
signal can be thought of as a function of both vertex and time
and can be denoted by x(n, t). It is worth mentioning that,
the graph itself, G, i.e., the vertices, edges, weights are not
changing with time in this case. If the topology of a graph
changes with time, it results in a dynamic graph, which is out
of the scope of this paper.
For time-varying graph signal x(n, t), the spectral repre-
sentations as well as the global and local smoothness of the
graph signals also change with time. In this paper, the k−th
eigenvalue, the k−th eigenvector, the GFT, and the vertex-
frequency energy distribution at time t will be denoted by
λk(t), uk(t), Xˆ(λk, t), and E(n, k, t), respectively. The local
smoothness of vertex n at time t will be denoted as s(n, t).
IV. GSP FOR DETECTING AND LOCATING CYBER ATTACKS
IN SMART GRIDS
A. Modeling cyber attacks in graph signals
For modeling cyber attacks in graph signal domain, let us
consider that a set of vertices, VA ⊂ V is under attack within
the time interval tstart to tend. The corrupted signal can be
expressed as follows:
x(nA, t) = c(t), for tstart ≤ t ≤ tend, (9)
where nA ∈ VA. In equation (9), c(t) represents the corrupted
signal under cyber attack in general case. Special types of
cyber attacks can be modeled by different considerations over
c(t). For instance, in case of DoS attack, one can consider
c(t) = 0. For data replay attack, c(t) ∈ {x(n, tp)}, where
tp < tstart. For other false data injection attacks (FDIA), c(t)
is designed intelligently using different techniques usually to
hide the attack.
B. Detection of cyber attacks using GFT
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Fig. 3. GFT Magnitude Response for IEEE 118 bus system: Emphasized high
graph-frequency components can be observed in case of false data injection.
In this section, it is shown that stresses in the power grid
can be detected from the GFT coefficients of the signal. In
general, the low-frequency components are prominent for the
bus voltage angle graph signals because of the smooth changes
of bus-to-bus values due to the power flow dynamics. The GFT
coefficient magnitudes with respect to the normalized graph-
frequencies (i.e., λˆk =
λk−mini{λi}
maxi{λi}−mini{λi}
) are illustrated in
Fig. 3 for a bus-voltage angle graph signal defined on the graph
of the IEEE 118 bus system under normal conditions as well
as under a false data injection attack. It can be observed that
the magnitude of the high-frequency components is larger in
the second case. This property can be exploited for detection
of anomalies in the measurement data. A parameter γ(t) is
introduced to quantify the amount of high graph-frequency
components corresponding to a graph signal x(n, t) at the time
instant t as follows:
γ(t) =
∑
k
|Xˆ(λˆk, t)H(λˆk)|, (10)
where H(λ) is a high-pass graph filter expressed by the
following frequency response:
H(λ) =
{
0 if λ ≤ λc
1 if λ > λc,
(11)
where λc is the cut-off graph-frequency. For detecting cyber
and physical stresses, we estimate the probability distribution
of the parameter γ in normal conditions from the historical
data (assuming γ is a stationary random variable and denote
its distribution as pγ(ζ)). For a certain time instant t, a stress
is declared if the likelihood of γ(t) corresponding to the distri-
bution is less than a certain threshold θγ , (i.e., pγ(γ(t)) < θγ).
The threshold θγ is selected empirically considering the tail
probabilities of pγ(ζ). Although this method detects cyber
attacks reasonably well, the major drawback of this method
is that it cannot provide any information about the location of
the attack.
C. Detecting and locating stresses using smoothness of graph
signals
Fig. 4 illustrates the local smoothness of the vertices of
the IEEE 118 bus system corresponding to the bus-vertex
graph G and graph signal x(n) in the normal condition (Fig.
4(a)) as well as under DoS attack at bus number 100. It
can be observed that the local smoothness of the vertices in
the vicinity of vertex number 100 have changed significantly.
Here, we propose to exploit this effect on the local smoothness
of the vertices to detect and locate cyber attacks. For detecting
and locating cyber attacks and line tripping, the historical data
have been used to estimate the probability distribution of the
local smoothness of the n−th vertex psn(ζ) under normal
conditions. At time instant t, if the likelihood of s(n, t) is
less than a certain threshold θsn (i.e., psn(s(n, t)) < θsn ), a
stress is declared at vertex n.
A similar technique can be applied on the graph signal
xL(nL) representing real-power flow through transmission line
nL associated with the line-vertex graph GL to detect and
locate single line failure.
D. Detecting and locating stresses using vertex-frequency
energy distribution
In this work, it is shown that the vertex-frequency energy
distribution of the time-varying graph signal x(n, t) associated
6Fig. 4. Local Smoothness of the vertices of the IEEE 118 bus system: (a)
Normal Condition, (b) DoS Attack at bus number 100.
with the bus-vertex graph G can be used to detect and locate
anomalous data in smart grids. Containing the topological and
the spectral information simultaneously, the vertex-frequency
energy distribution makes itself more suitable for detecting
and locating anomalies in complex networks. Moreover, due
to the better concentration of signal energy compared to the
linear joint vertex-frequency representations, it serves better
for locating cyber attack.
Let us consider the time-vertex graph signal x(n, t), which
can also be thought as a set of time series each associated
with the vertices. Let tA be the time instant at which the cyber
attack is introduced into the grid. x(n, tA − ǫ) is the vertex-
domain graph signal just before the attack (under normal
conditions), whereas x(n, tA + ǫ) is the vertex-domain graph
signal just after the attack (under a cyber attack) and ǫ is
a small real value. E(n, k, tA − ǫ) and E(n, k, tA + ǫ) are
the vertex-frequency energy distributions corresponding to the
graph signals x(n, tA − ǫ) and x(n, tA + ǫ), respectively.
Cyber attacks (either DoS attacks or false data injection
attacks) involve abrupt and abnormal changes in the time-
vertex graph signal x(n, t), which also affect the graph-
spectral characteristics of the graph signal at that time instant
i.e., E(n, k, tA + ǫ). Hence, the vertex-frequency energy dis-
tributions before and after the cyber attack would have certain
differences. Our proposition is to utilize the difference between
these two, i.e., |E(n, k, tA + ǫ) − E(n, k, tA − ǫ)|, to detect
Attacked Bus
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Fig. 5. Marginalization over frequency components for locating vertex (bus),∑
N
k=1
|E(n, k, ta + ǫ)−E(n, k, ta − ǫ)|. For n = 86, the largest value is
obtained which indicates a stress at vertex (bus) 86.
and locate cyber attacks. By marginalizing the difference
distribution over the frequency axis, a comparatively larger
value has been obtained for the compromised vertices, e.g.,
vertex 86 of IEEE 118 bus system in Fig. 5.
Although the joint vertex-frequency energy distribution pro-
vides important insights and justifications for detecting and
locating cyber attacks in the power grid, the direct implemen-
tation of this technique on |E(n, k, tA+ ǫ)−E(n, k, tA− ǫ)|,
faces the challenge of selecting the proper threshold of detec-
tion in the joint-vertex frequency domain. For this reason, the
instantaneous vertex-frequency energy distribution E(n, k, t)
is directly marginalized over the spectral index k to obtain
the energy distributions with respect to the vertex indices at a
certain time:
N∑
k=1
E(n, k, t) = |x(n, t)|2, (12)
and set the threshold of detection over the distribution of
|x(n, t)|2. We consider that for the voltage angle measure-
ments the values of x(n, t) are normally distributed for each
n and t with a mean value µn,t and standard deviation σn.
Therefore, the probability distribution of |x(n, t)|2 is a piece-
wise gamma distribution with the parameters, µn,t and σn, for
each n and t:
pn,t(y) =
1
2σn
√
2πy
[e
−(
y−µn,t
2σn
2
)
u(y − µn,t)+
e
−(
µn,t−y
2σn
2
)
u(µn,t − y)], (13)
where u(y) is the unit step function.
Here, µn,t is approximated by the sample mean within a
small interval [t− δ, t]. Within that small interval x(n, t) has
been considered to be wide sense stationary:
µn,t =
∫ t
t−δ
x(n, τ)dτ. (14)
For all the vertices n, the standard deviation σn is obtained
from the past historical data. For each time instant and each
bus, the likelihood of |x(n, t)|2 is calculated using Equation
(13). If the likelihood is less than a certain threshold θx2,n
7for any |x(n, t)|2, an attack is declared and bus number n
is considered as the compromised bus. For the detection and
locating of the physical failure, a similar method can be
applied on the line-vertex graph GL using the graph signal
xL(nL, t), which represents the angle of the line current
through branch nL.
V. SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
The IEEE 118 bus system has been used for the evaluation
of the proposed techniques. The power flow solutions have
obtained using MATPOWER 6.0 [42]. For time series asso-
ciated with the graph vertices, the time-varying load patterns
from the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO)
[43] have been used.
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Fig. 6. Detection accuracy with respect to α.
For the evaluation of the performance of the detection
and locating techniques for cyber attacks, the anomalous data
associated with the nA−th bus, (nA ∈ VA, where VA ⊂ V
is the set of vertices with falsified measurements) have been
designed as follows:
θnAFalse = θnA + (−1)dα.u.Range(θnA), (15)
where θnA is the true measurement associated with the nA−th
bus, θnAFalse is the falsified measurement, d ∈ {0, 1} is
a binary random variable, u ∈ [0, 1] is a random number,
Range(θnA) is the range of the true measurement at the
n−th bus obtained from the simulation data, and α is the
random parameter representing the amount of change in the
measurement values. As α increases, the detection of attack
becomes easier. In this paper, the performance of cyber at-
tack detection using the three proposed methods have been
analyzed for various values of α. Specifically, 3, 000 random
scenarios have been generated for each value of α among
which some of the scenarios are normal and in the other
scenarios, there are one or more cyber attacks. The number
of attacks, the time instant of the attacks, and the injected
false value during the attack are also selected randomly. The
accuracy of cyber attack detection for different α values in the
three methods have been illustrated in Fig. 6. Both the value
of θγ and θsn are selected as 0.005. It can be observed that
the local smoothness method performs better than the other
two methods. Although the local smoothness method is the
best among the three for detecting cyber attacks, the vertex-
frequency energy distribution method outperforms this method
in terms of the locating rate. For example, when α = 4, the
locating rate in the local smoothness method is 0.85 whereas
it is 0.91 in the vertex-frequency energy distribution method.
For the performance evaluation of the detection and locating
techniques for a single line failure, 3, 000 random scenarios
have been created among which some scenarios are normal
and some scenarios involve single line failures. The tripped
branches are selected randomly. The accuracy of detection for
single line tripping in the vertex-frequency energy distribution
method is 0.80 with a false positive rate of 0.25 whereas in
the local smoothness method the detection rate is 0.93 with a
false positive rate of only 0.03. The locating rate within 2-hop
distance and 3-hop distance in the local smoothness method
are, respectively, 0.55 and 0.65.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, graph signal processing is utilized to represent
and analyze the power grid’s measurement data for reliability
and security evaluation of the system under various stresses.
The physical structure of the power grid has been used to
define the graph domain with the measurements associated
with the grid as the graph signals. The effects of the cyber
and physical stresses on the graph signals have been studied in
the vertex domain, graph-frequency domain, and joint vertex-
frequency domain of the signals. Based on the observations
from the effects of stresses, three techniques for detecting
and locating cyber and physical stresses based on the graph
Fourier transform, the local smoothness of graph signals, and
the vertex-frequency energy distributions are proposed. The
performance of the proposed methods has been evaluated using
various scenarios of cyber and physical stresses. It has been
shown that the graph signal processing techniques can provide
good performance for detecting and locating stresses in the
system.
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